Other than the sense of grief over the bitterly great lost of "Vinalines Queen" and 22 (twenty-two) of her crew members, what do the ship -owners, operators, professional seafarers have as an experienced lesson? The records show that we do have lost much in terms of life and property offshore over the past several decades since Vietnam had its own maritime industry.
Some, who are managing or working on merchant ocean-going vessels might think the lost at sea in the past due to lack of modern navigational devices or equipment, small size of vessel and her old age. Therefore, they haven't seriously taken into account the importance of safety management and operation of the ship as well as profession of shipboard personnel. They can now take M/V Vinalines Queen's horrible tragedy for granted to hit the ball managing their fleets in general and their seamen in particular better.
Who was our "Queen" and her servants?
* Queen's biography (Ship Particulars)
- Name: M/V Vinalines Queen
- Ship type: Bulk Carrier - Dry Cargo
- Built: 2005
- Builder: Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding, Tamano - Japan.
- Flag: Vietnam
- Class: NKK (?)
- IMO: 9290907 (unlucky number?)
- Call sign: XVHG
- 574953000
- DWT: 56,040
- GT: 31,247
- NT: 18,504
- LOA: 189,99 mtrs
- Beam: 32.26 mtrs
- Draft: 12.1 m
- 5 HOLDS 5 HATCHES
- CRANE 4 X 25 TONS + GRABS 4 X 12 CBM
- Capacity: GRAIN 70,810.70 CBM BALE 68,044.20 CBM
- Speed: 13.5 K
* Queen's servants (Shipboard personnel)
- Total of crew member: 23
- Crew manning company: HAIPHONG CREWING CENTRE (VNHCC)
- Captain: Nguyen Van Thien (DOB - 1968); Chief Deck Officer: Ho Quang Duc (DOB - 1981); Chief Engineer: Le Ba Truc (DOB - 1953)
* Shipowner and Manager
- Ship owner/manager: Vinalines Shipping (the subsidiary company of Vinalines);
- Previous manager: Vinalines Hai Phong (VNL Queen was transfered to Vinalines Shipping because of restructuring of Vinashin)
* Other related info:
- Hull insurer: ABIC
- P&I insurer: PVI
- Latest Voy: L/D Port Morowali – Indonesia/ Ningde - China
- Cargo: Nickel 54,400MT
- Last reported position: 20-00N; 123-47.1E, sea area between Luzon Island, Philippines and Taiwan.
It has been uncertainly to ascribe a known cause of sinking thus far, or assure the shipwreck is now really laid on seabed. We also cannot make any comments on technical condition of the vessel if there won't be any maintenance or specific reports available at hand, and what we know is the captioned vessel was built in 2005 by Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding, Tamano - Japan. Hence there was unlikely a possibility of sinking resulted from technical problems based on her age.
Vietnamese ship-owners haven't been really aware of carrying dangerous goods like Nickel, there are probably some of competent Captains of Vosco (Vietnam Ocean Shipping JSC) have experienced real life-threatening situation caused by Nickel liquidization when their vessel carried that commodity. Vosco crew members were in the same hazardous distress as Queen's when they had a significant list of 20 degrees more or less sailing in bad weather, however with Vosco crew knew how to deal with it experientially. So the point is how well Queen's deck management officers really knew about easily liquified characteristic of Nickel, was that enough to measure of danger when humidity of the goods may increase to 10% while Queen seemed to be in max-loadable condition sailing in hard weather.
The correlation between the cargo quantity and vessel capacity negatively reflects Captain and his Chief Mate's perception of liquifying rate of Nickel. With 54,400MT of Nickel shipping on a 56,040 DWT, was it safe when Nickel liquifying led to an increase in cargo weight that vessel had to carry. Also, heaviness of bunker, fresh water, crew members, spare parts, provisions, etc. would be a considerable factor in this case.
Navigational experience and making a safe stowage plan are very fundamental requirements to Master and Chief Mate in order to have a safe voyage. However, Capt. Nguyen Van Thien had only three years experience serving on ocean-going vessels at highest rank, yet does number of voyages, that he served, exceed 30? Even Capt. Thien was a marine navigational lecturer of Vietnam Maritime University, but a mariner is much different from a talent scholar. Chief Mate Ho Quang Duc was at the age of 31 when he took over chief deck job, that we can consider him as a freshman for his position assigned. The quality of Vietnamese seafarers and their co-operation with ship-owner and involved parties are big issues as well. As a Crew Manning Manager and doing Fleet managerial job, I ever strongly refused to employ a non-experienced C/O candidate (Chief Deck Officer) provided by a crew center that also supplied manpower to Vinalines Queen due to his very young age and lack of working experience, despite his specialty and English proficiency were acceptable.
Besides, quick promotion, the Vietnamese seafarers have a very poor training in comparison with other foreign counterparts in area such as Philippines, Indonesia, Indian, etc. result in unsafe operation and management at sea. How many percent of on-boarded ship crew members thoroughly read the "Safety Management Manual"? Do all the crew members seriously conduct and take part in abandon ship drill, or lifeboat, rescue boat launching, etc. as required by international regulations and conventions? Some just report to offshore office that they have done it properly and companies will compliantly have sufficient drill and training records for DOC annual audits then. It's quick and economically convenient for parties. Who cares?
If one has ever worked in maritime industry as a ship-owner or operator will accept that PSC (Port State Control) and related parties at some ports of call in developing countries such as Indonesia and China can have vessels' non-conformity remarks rectified with a couple hundred bucks. Thus, we cannot rely on reports at loading port to affirm both cargo and vessel are truly in acceptable condition to safely departure.
Which devices can the crew use to transmit SOS, signal maritime distress message to the nearest coastal rescue station, or advise their urgency to responsible parties? All on-servicing ocean-going vessels have its such mentioned facilities checked before vessels can departure for next port of call, and others for tracking vessel position and sailing traits, such as SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) test, EPIRB (Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons), VDR (Voyage Data Recorder), LRIT (long-range identification and tracking). However, being in life-threatening minutes Queen's crew could not do the most important task that they should have done before the ship was completely submerged in the cold seawater, sending the distress message that includes vessel position. When did the ship have a significant list? Did Master report to Vinalines Shipping immediately after he realized what was going on to his ship? In practice, there were some unofficial reports, sometimes not made by Mater but other Ratings disclosing that in order to protect his own prestige, Master would keep the distress deals during his service for himself, tried to fix the problems which are considered as human errors before the vessel reaching discharging port; and only inform related parities for supports when everything was out of control or he had no clue on what he would do.
Vinalines Queen's tragedy was a man-made one and ship-owner really risked its big amount of money and reputation when manoeuvred unsuitable manpower to a supramax vessel. Who are mostly suffered from this lost consequently? The answer is crew and their families.
Some, who are managing or working on merchant ocean-going vessels might think the lost at sea in the past due to lack of modern navigational devices or equipment, small size of vessel and her old age. Therefore, they haven't seriously taken into account the importance of safety management and operation of the ship as well as profession of shipboard personnel. They can now take M/V Vinalines Queen's horrible tragedy for granted to hit the ball managing their fleets in general and their seamen in particular better.
Who was our "Queen" and her servants?
* Queen's biography (Ship Particulars)
- Name: M/V Vinalines Queen
- Ship type: Bulk Carrier - Dry Cargo
- Built: 2005
- Builder: Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding, Tamano - Japan.
- Flag: Vietnam
- Class: NKK (?)
- IMO: 9290907 (unlucky number?)
- Call sign: XVHG
- 574953000
- DWT: 56,040
- GT: 31,247
- NT: 18,504
- LOA: 189,99 mtrs
- Beam: 32.26 mtrs
- Draft: 12.1 m
- 5 HOLDS 5 HATCHES
- CRANE 4 X 25 TONS + GRABS 4 X 12 CBM
- Capacity: GRAIN 70,810.70 CBM BALE 68,044.20 CBM
- Speed: 13.5 K
* Queen's servants (Shipboard personnel)
- Total of crew member: 23
- Crew manning company: HAIPHONG CREWING CENTRE (VNHCC)
- Captain: Nguyen Van Thien (DOB - 1968); Chief Deck Officer: Ho Quang Duc (DOB - 1981); Chief Engineer: Le Ba Truc (DOB - 1953)
* Shipowner and Manager
- Ship owner/manager: Vinalines Shipping (the subsidiary company of Vinalines);
- Previous manager: Vinalines Hai Phong (VNL Queen was transfered to Vinalines Shipping because of restructuring of Vinashin)
* Other related info:
- Hull insurer: ABIC
- P&I insurer: PVI
- Latest Voy: L/D Port Morowali – Indonesia/ Ningde - China
- Cargo: Nickel 54,400MT
- Last reported position: 20-00N; 123-47.1E, sea area between Luzon Island, Philippines and Taiwan.
It has been uncertainly to ascribe a known cause of sinking thus far, or assure the shipwreck is now really laid on seabed. We also cannot make any comments on technical condition of the vessel if there won't be any maintenance or specific reports available at hand, and what we know is the captioned vessel was built in 2005 by Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding, Tamano - Japan. Hence there was unlikely a possibility of sinking resulted from technical problems based on her age.
Vietnamese ship-owners haven't been really aware of carrying dangerous goods like Nickel, there are probably some of competent Captains of Vosco (Vietnam Ocean Shipping JSC) have experienced real life-threatening situation caused by Nickel liquidization when their vessel carried that commodity. Vosco crew members were in the same hazardous distress as Queen's when they had a significant list of 20 degrees more or less sailing in bad weather, however with Vosco crew knew how to deal with it experientially. So the point is how well Queen's deck management officers really knew about easily liquified characteristic of Nickel, was that enough to measure of danger when humidity of the goods may increase to 10% while Queen seemed to be in max-loadable condition sailing in hard weather.
The correlation between the cargo quantity and vessel capacity negatively reflects Captain and his Chief Mate's perception of liquifying rate of Nickel. With 54,400MT of Nickel shipping on a 56,040 DWT, was it safe when Nickel liquifying led to an increase in cargo weight that vessel had to carry. Also, heaviness of bunker, fresh water, crew members, spare parts, provisions, etc. would be a considerable factor in this case.
Navigational experience and making a safe stowage plan are very fundamental requirements to Master and Chief Mate in order to have a safe voyage. However, Capt. Nguyen Van Thien had only three years experience serving on ocean-going vessels at highest rank, yet does number of voyages, that he served, exceed 30? Even Capt. Thien was a marine navigational lecturer of Vietnam Maritime University, but a mariner is much different from a talent scholar. Chief Mate Ho Quang Duc was at the age of 31 when he took over chief deck job, that we can consider him as a freshman for his position assigned. The quality of Vietnamese seafarers and their co-operation with ship-owner and involved parties are big issues as well. As a Crew Manning Manager and doing Fleet managerial job, I ever strongly refused to employ a non-experienced C/O candidate (Chief Deck Officer) provided by a crew center that also supplied manpower to Vinalines Queen due to his very young age and lack of working experience, despite his specialty and English proficiency were acceptable.
Besides, quick promotion, the Vietnamese seafarers have a very poor training in comparison with other foreign counterparts in area such as Philippines, Indonesia, Indian, etc. result in unsafe operation and management at sea. How many percent of on-boarded ship crew members thoroughly read the "Safety Management Manual"? Do all the crew members seriously conduct and take part in abandon ship drill, or lifeboat, rescue boat launching, etc. as required by international regulations and conventions? Some just report to offshore office that they have done it properly and companies will compliantly have sufficient drill and training records for DOC annual audits then. It's quick and economically convenient for parties. Who cares?
If one has ever worked in maritime industry as a ship-owner or operator will accept that PSC (Port State Control) and related parties at some ports of call in developing countries such as Indonesia and China can have vessels' non-conformity remarks rectified with a couple hundred bucks. Thus, we cannot rely on reports at loading port to affirm both cargo and vessel are truly in acceptable condition to safely departure.
Which devices can the crew use to transmit SOS, signal maritime distress message to the nearest coastal rescue station, or advise their urgency to responsible parties? All on-servicing ocean-going vessels have its such mentioned facilities checked before vessels can departure for next port of call, and others for tracking vessel position and sailing traits, such as SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) test, EPIRB (Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons), VDR (Voyage Data Recorder), LRIT (long-range identification and tracking). However, being in life-threatening minutes Queen's crew could not do the most important task that they should have done before the ship was completely submerged in the cold seawater, sending the distress message that includes vessel position. When did the ship have a significant list? Did Master report to Vinalines Shipping immediately after he realized what was going on to his ship? In practice, there were some unofficial reports, sometimes not made by Mater but other Ratings disclosing that in order to protect his own prestige, Master would keep the distress deals during his service for himself, tried to fix the problems which are considered as human errors before the vessel reaching discharging port; and only inform related parities for supports when everything was out of control or he had no clue on what he would do.
Vinalines Queen's tragedy was a man-made one and ship-owner really risked its big amount of money and reputation when manoeuvred unsuitable manpower to a supramax vessel. Who are mostly suffered from this lost consequently? The answer is crew and their families.
